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PLATO'S POLITICAL IDEAS 
If we seek a rallying point, to begin with, for Plato's political 
conceptions, we shall find, I think, that they all centre about a 
single idea-the idea of justice. No other problem has given rise 
to more discussion, I. suppose, than just this problem of the 
relation of justice to society and the individuals composing it; 
and in no age, perhaps, has it given rise to more discussion than it 
did in the age of Plato. The difficulty has to do partly with the 
nature of justice itself and partly with the discovery of a practical 
working definition. Abstractly it is easy enough to explain that 
justice consists in giving every one exactly what he deserves. 
But who in any conceivable state of society is able to determine 
exactly what anyone deserves-least of all himself; and how is it 
possible to make sure that he gets it, neither more nor less? It is 
bad enough to administer the approximate, the rough and ready 
justice of the courts of law without undertaking to settle such 
questions as these with the fallible judgment at our disposal. 
And in default of the competence and method necessary to such 
an adjustment society has been obliged to muddle along as best 
it might, allowing the individual, within certain limits, to take 
what he can get, under the dubious pretence of legality, without 
considering too closely whether he deserves it or not, in accord-
ance with the good old plan, 
"That he should take who has the power 
And he should keep who can." 
Under these circumstances there has gradually grown up a 
kind of discrepancy between men's professions and their practices, J.-
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l:ietwb~11 the sort of thing that they talk in public and the sort of 
thing that they confess only to themselves or acknowledge only· 
by their actions. On the one hand they pretend to be animated, 
both as individuals and as citizens, by a single and unique pre-
occupatiQn with justice, upon which they assert their community 
and government are founded. On the other hand they seek their 
own advantage by any means in their power, regardless of their 
neighbours or of any particular ideal of right and wrong. Eulo-
gising virtue and honesty with their lips, they recognise in their 
hearts that nine times out of ten such scruples are merely side-
issues, that the main aim is success, and that success is not to the 
good, the virtuous, and the honest, but to the strong, the au-
dacious, and the adroit. It is the latter sort of man who gets on 
in the world; he is honoured, flattered, respected without concern 
for his merits. He enjoys the esteem of the public, he unites their 
votes, he holds their offices, he rewards his friends and punishes 
his enemies. And what is more, he carries his point, he con-
trols the administration of what he and everyone else calls 
justice, he influences legislation and law in his own sense. In 
short, justice becomes merely his conveniency, the conveniency 
of the powerful. And in the meanwhile we go on, in our fatuity, 
calling the conveniency of the unjust justice and speaking as 
though justice were the foundation of our polity, when in reality 
its foundation is force or fraud in one form or another. Why 
not come out with it, then, flat-footed? Is anybody the dupe of 
our hypocrisy? Why not say that it is the smooth appearance, 
the plausible pretence of justice that we have in mind when we 
educate our children in the shams of honesty and virtue? Why 
not acknowledge that it is a mask for their actions with which we 
are providing them? That we are teaching them a vocabulary 
with which to impose upon the simple and credulous who accept 
phrases, like specie, at their face value? Why not confess among 
ourselves that our little speeches about justice are for business 
and politics, a mere diplomacy of language; but that for the prac-
tical afIairsof life our incentives are success and self-advancement? 
In other words, why not define justice as the advantage of the 
reigning interests whatever they may happen to be at the time? 
Modem as all these notions seem, though cloaked as a general 
thing with a decent reticence, they are all, as a matter of fact, to 
be found in Plato. They are to be found in the mouth of Thrasy-
machus in the Republic,. they are to be found in the mouths of the 
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Sophists, of Callides and Protagoras and Gorgias, the rationalists 
and utilitarians of the time, with whom they were as favourite 
doctrines as with Nietzsche. Indeed, it is as though the young 
men of Plato had been reading Nietzsche over night. They are 
full of the futility of virtue and honesty and justice, of the 
expediency of wickedness and the high hand, of the natural rights 
of the strong and the dexterous over the weak and the simple, of 
the excellence of success and the legitimacy of any means by 
which it may be attained. 
It is against these thinkers that Plato undertakes to vindicate 
the desirability of a genuine and absolute justice, and it is in 
opposition to their notions of government that he attempts to 
rear an ideal republic upon the comer stone which they have 
rejected as unfit for the purpose. And what concerns him most, 
to begin with, is less justice as a foundation of government than 
justice as a foundation of character. At the outset it is the 
individual to whom his gaze is directed and not the community. 
In one sense his Republic is less interesting as a plan of society 
than as a kind of symbol of the human spirit. It is the inner city, 
the city of the soul, the spiritual city, upon which he has his 
mind's eye; and he constructs his ideal polity for the sake of 
comparison. The justice which it is so difficult to study in the 
small letters of the individual, he hopes to read to better advan-
tage in the capital letters of the city. For after all the just man 
and the just city are counterparts one of the other, and what is 
justice in the individual is justice also in the community or 
contrariwise. 
With this idea in mind, then, his first care is to re-establish 
the cause of justice and virtue as the basis of human character. 
And to do so he proceeds to argue that man is happy just because 
he is virtuous. To declare that virtue insures success and that 
honesty is the best policy is absurd and mischievous. The upright 
man may be successful or not-it makes no difference; in any 
case he can dispense with success, his satisfaction is in his own 
merit. Strip him of the goods of existence; refuse him the respect 
due to his qualities; worse than that, let him have the reputation 
of an ill doer; and last of all, let his righteousness escape the 
recognition of the gods themselves-even then, as compared with 
the wicked flourishing in prosperity, surrounded with admiring 
followers and flatterers, and blest in spite of reality with the name 
and character of virtue; even then, says Plato, will the just man 
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be happy and the unjust wretched. Yes, it is better to suffer 
. injustice than to commit it. And if the wicked understood his 
own best interest, he ought to desire nothing so much as to be 
brought to justice, to expiate his misdeeds, and by so doing regain 
his innocency. 
But this justice which forms the basis of character and which, 
properly understood, insures the only genuine happiness, what is 
it? Who is the just man? It must be confessed that Plato's 
definition strikes the modem as rather peculiar, mainly, I think, 
because it lays no particular stress upon the rewards accruing. 
At the same time it seems to me that it has one advantage over 
other definitions in being the only one which furnishes in any 
sense a working formula for the regulation and adjustment of 
human affairs. And it does so by indicating the conditions under 
which alone justice can work itself out. I t indicates as nearly as 
can be done, I fancy, the manner in which some sort of relative 
justice can be attained. I t has its difficulties too, but as a defini-
tion it has this advantage. 
Justice, then, in the individual consists in a kind of balance 
or equilibrium among the faculties by virtue of which each is en-
abled to do its proper work and to contribute in its proper degree 
to the welfare of the entire being. In other words, justice is de-
fined by its obligations rather than by its privileges, one reason 
evidently why the definition is bound to be distasteful to us nowa-
days. In Plato's mind there existed a sort of hierarchy among the 
faculties. At the top stood the mind, the vou~, what the Ger-
mans call Vernunft; at the bottom lay the appetites and passions; 
and midway between was situated the courage or mettle, the 
kind of thing we think of when we speak of a man of spirit. In 
the just man the mind or reason should rule. And by mind or 
reason Plato understood not merely the discoursive or syllogistic 
reason or ratiocination but something akin as well to divination, 
intuition, or insight. Of the perception of higher truth he always 
speaks as an oqit~ or SEa, a seeing or vision. To this principle the 
passions and appetities are to be kept in subordination by means 
of the animation or courage, which in a correct balance of the 
faculties allies itself with the mind or YOu~. Such is the just man; 
he is the man who has harmonised and ordered his spirit in this 
wise. 
In this respect, it will be noticed, Plato stands at the antipodes 
from the Bergsonians, who seem in some obscure manner to 
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divorce the intuition as an organ of truth from the reason and to 
associate it with the instincts, so making of it a servant or con..: 
federate of the third estate.- In this interpretation the mind is 
left in isolation with no direct and instant perception of reality, 
while the sole reality immediately appreciable becomes that of the 
desires and impulses-a sense of eternal mobility and flux, in 
which the foundations of character are submerged and finally 
swept away, and truth itself loses all stability and degenerates 
into an exclusive regard for the many as the sole reliable data of 
consciousness. 
Now it is in just the contrary sense, for the sake of making 
his idea of the hegemony of reason clearer, that Plato undertakes 
to construct an ideal polity, where it will be easier to recognise 
the qualities of justice in accordance with his conception of the 
parallelism between individual and state. To take this structure 
of Plato's quite literally, as has been done so often, would be to 
make a grave mistake and to prove oneself more of a Platonist 
than Plato himself. As a matter of fact Plato is not wholly 
serious about his republic. He is led to introduce the subject in 
the first place as an illustration of his general theory of justice. 
Such, he says, would be the perfect state, where justice may be 
studied to the best advantage. Once embarked, however, he 
becomes interested in the undertaking for its own sake and dwells 
complacently upon its details; occasionally he is quite carried 
away by it. But on the whole, ~he plan itself remains a jeu 
d'esprit, a play of the imagination, which he never expects or 
hopes to see realised in anything like the shape in which he pro-
poses it, as is evident from a comparison with his Laws. It is, 
then, a species of allegory or parable-or better, perhaps, a 
metaphor; it is seriously meant, not as a practical project, but as 
an illustration of Plato's general ideas of government, and it is 
full of penetrating aper~us with regard to human nature and 
society. 
Ideally, then, such a city as he proposes as a paradigm of the 
. just man, is composed of three definite and distinct classes or 
orders analogous to the three faculties of the individual. At the 
bottom there are the workers of all kinds-tillers of the soil, 
labourers, handicraftsmen, merchants-all who contribute to 
the support of the community. Just above are the warriors, the 
protectors and guardians of the commonwealth, answering to the 
courageous or spirited principle in man. From the latter are 
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chosen the rulers, who in the perfect city are philosophers pre-
pared for their work by a long and arduous discipline and selected 
by successive eliminations from the mass of the warriors. As 
philosophers they are naturally unwilling to undertake the task of 
government and are moved to do so only by a sense of their 
responsibilities as the sole members of the city competent for the 
business. They descend into politics as a man who had been used 
to the light of day would descend into a den or cavern. But then, 
no man who wishes to rule is fit, in Plato's opinion, to do so. In a 
state so constituted justice will consist, as before, in a balance or 
equilibrium of forces under the direction of these philosopher-
rulers, who make up the YOUc; or mind of the community. They 
will be assisted in their labours by the class of warriors or guard-
ians, who, like the courageous part of the individual, are intrusted 
with the preservation of order as well from sedition within as 
from hostility without. Of the workmen Plato has little to say; 
they fail to interest him particularly as long as they do their work 
in subservience to their superiors and provide for the subsistence 
of themselves and others. At the same time it would be a mis-
take to suppose thai he contemplates their condition as one of 
serfdom or slavery, though to such a condition he has no great 
objection in the abstract. In this instance, however, his city 
exists as a whole for the benefit of its inhabitants-or rather, it 
would express his meaning better to say that the inhabitants 
exist for the benefit of the city. It is not for the sake of the well-
being of such and such a person, he declares, that the state exists, 
but for the well-being of the whole. In this way the working class 
has its share of the advantages resulting from the organisation-
a share proportionate to its abilities and importance. As in the 
case of the purely physical principle in the individual, however, 
its predominance over the other orders would mean confusion and 
disaster. I t has neither the wisdom of the lawgiver nor the 
mettle of the warrior. It is, therefore, as though Plato took it for 
granted or assumed it rather than despised it. As its functions are 
perfectly familiar already, he sees no need to dwell upon them. 
Of the warriors, on the contrary, he has much to say that is 
curious and interesting. In this connection it must be remem-
bered that the rulers are originally members of this class, being 
selected from it in accordance with certain standards so that up 
to a given point the conditions of both are alike. It is evident 
that these two classes taken together form an aristocracy; there 
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is no doubt about it, they are the superiors of the third estate in 
every respect. Distinction of classes is a postulate of the system ; 
it is a part of the conception of justice, for without distinction 
justice becomes unthinkable and the acme of injustice resides 
in the socialistic conception of an equal participation by unequal 
participants. And this distinction he purposes further to 
strengthen by means of a gross convention such as necessarily 
underlies every government, whether it happens to be that of the 
divine right of kings or that of the divinity of the people's voice 
and the sacredness of the will of the majority. Pure convention 
in either case and equally preposterous on examination. But so 
it is and so it is indispensable. And in like manner Plato proposes 
the necessary convention at the root of his polity. We will teach 
the people, he advises, that while they are all of the earth and 
brothers, yet they are made of different materials-some of gold 
and some of silver and some of bronze; and the nobler the metal, 
the nobler the creature. This is pretty gross, to be sure-pretty 
nearly as gross as the infallibility of majorities; not quite, per-
haps, but still gross enough in all conscience-and yet admirably 
adapted to the purpose-to safeguard the distinction and hier-
archy of the several classes and orders. At the same time its 
crudity was tempered in practice by the circumstance that Plato 
provided for a rectification of the errors of birth. If a gold or 
silver child should be born in the brazen class, he was promptly 
to be promoted as soon as he manifested his quality; on the other 
hand, if a bronze child should be born of gold or silver parents, he 
was liable to degradation in like manner. 
Though an aristocracy, then, in the most distinctive sense, 
the two upper classes were an aristocracy of merit. As a result 
they were not simply an aristocracy of privilege but an aris-
tocracy of responsibility. They were carefully educated and 
trained; their life was a severe and strenuous drill in the form of 
a rigid communism. They had no right to property of any kind 
save their clothes and their arms. They were without homes; 
the houses in which they lived, when they lived in houses rather 
than in camp, were not their own. They received their support 
from the community. They ate in messes. They held their 
wives and their children in common. Their marriages were tem-
porary; and the offspring of their transient unions were taken 
possession of by the state and cared for in public nurseries. No 
man was supposed to be able to recognise his own child or 
8 THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
identify it. Woman, as having the same faculties as man only 
weaker, was to bear her part in the same affairs and occupations. 
Like him she was to exercise in the palrestra; like him she was 
to bear arms and fight the battles of her country; like him she was 
to eat in her mess and live homeless and free of permanent ties 
save her duty to the state and society. 
By such ways and by such means did Plato dream of founding 
and preserving an efficient and uncorrupted aristocracy. Shock-
ing as some of these notions are to the modern consciousness, 
there is still something to be said for them in theory if not in 
practice. I t was in some such manner that the monastic orders 
were managed; and no more powerful and effective organisations 
ever existed. But then they were pledged to chastity as well as to 
poverty; and there are but two ways to be chaste-either to have 
no wife or to have only one, of which the former is doubtless the 
better if it were not for the difficulty of perpetuating the caste. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that Plato has recog-
nised one important truth: that an aristocracy, to be worthy of 
the name, must be free from individual self-seeking and from the 
distracting influence of feminine frivolity. Let the order be as 
wealthy as you please-the wealthier, the better as an order; but 
see that its members remain unmoved by hopes of personal 
enrichment, if they are to devote themselves heart and soul to the 
furtherance of the object for which their body as a whole exists. 
And see too that they are removed from the insinuations of the 
sex with its vanities and caprices and irrelevances, if they are to 
amount to anything as public officials. Even as it is, there is 
nothing more egotistic than the father of a family, who is obliged 
to prefer the welfare of his wife and children before that of his 
neighbours; there is nothing more disheartening in the pursuit 
of a disinterested aim than the reproaches of a family which 
imagines its own interests to be neglected and is piqued at the 
prosperity of acquaintances and associates. Even at the present 
day there is nothing more exigent than the claims of a family. 
How much greater must have been its distractions at the time of 
Plato, when wives were ignorant as well as idle and luxurious! 
Consider the confusion introduced into Socrates's final interview 
with his friends by the irruption of Xantippe. All this Plato 
saw; he had probably some knowledge of Xantippe himself and 
the kind of house she kept for her husband. And against this 
sort of thing he tried to provide by breaking up the home in the 
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interests of disinterestedness and by abrogating the importunities 
of wife and children at the same time that he removed the 
children from the timid and selfish instruction of their parents. 
And for his day, too, he would have accomplished not a little in 
giving woman something to do, in supplying her with a mission, 
or to employ the modern cant, in making her an instrument of 
social service. But after all, he reckoned without his host; he 
failed to count with human nature, and he proposes as a remedy 
for human weakness what is bound to seem to the average man 
something little short of a monstrosity. 
But after all, in this vision of things as they might be one 
must not take Plato too seriously. Nobody was ever more 
conscious of the difficulties and paradoxes of his plan than he 
himself. Even in his own eyes it is hardly more than a castle in 
the air, to which he attaches only a relative importance save in as 
far as it helps him to realise his idea and principle of justice. 
Evidently in such a city as this, where everything is properly 
disposed and where every man is in the right place, justice will 
consist in everyone's minding his own business. The well-being 
of the community will depend upon every individual's and every 
class's doing its own work and fulfilling its own function in its 
proper station in life. In other words, justice in the large as in the 
small is simply order. This is the reason why it seems to me that 
Plato's definition has a certain experimental-I hesitate to say 
practical-value which is wanting to most definitions of justice. 
It specifies the actual conditions under which justice is possible; 
there are no nice appraisements and delicate assessments of 
awards and emoluments to be made. Provided every member of 
the community does the work for which he is fitted in the scale 
of his relative ability, he will automatically receive his deserts. 
And here is, of course, the crux of the system-the accurate 
direction of the citizens' proclivities; and though it is probably 
easier to determine what a man is fit for than what he is worth, 
still the former task is hard enough. And it is complicated by the 
not infrequent occurrence of the exceptional case, who would have 
fared worse under Plato's authority than he does in the present 
scheme of things. Such persons are not seldom of great value to 
society, although that value may not be capable of exact com-
putation. Of these exceptions the hardships are often extreme; 
they are suited for none of the usual employments, their services 
to the public are seldom recognised by their contemporaries, they 
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seem hardly to belong to the world into which they have been 
brought-their livelihood is as problematic as their utility. Such 
a character was Blake or Coleridge, to mention only poets. And 
yet the development of moral types of the sort is as important for 
civilisation as the production of Rothschilds or Bismarcks. In 
human society, as it is actually constituted by a free play of more 
or less spontaneous forces working elastically to approximate 
results, such characters are able, as a rule, to find some kind of 
place and existence, even though with difficulty. But in Plato's 
republic with its strict suppression of individualism they would 
have had no footing; contributing in no wise to the support or the 
protection of the government of the city, falling properly into 
none of his classes, they could expect no other fate than repudi-
ation and banishment. Such, as a matter of fact, is the sentence 
to which he condemns the poets; much as he loves them per-
sonally, his polity has no room for Homer or Hesiod or Sophocles. 
They are but fabulists and makers of falsehood. At most they 
can be tolerated only as they will consent to teach useful and 
salutary truths; that is, as far as they cease to be variations and 
conform to the normal type of society. 
But however this may be, whatever the difficulties and in-
consistencies even of an ideal constitution, one thing is clear-
Plato's conception of justice as an order or balance of forces in an 
individual and a community. Such has been his objective from 
the first, much as he may have loitered by the way attracted by 
the scenery along the roadside. Once he has reached this con-
clusion, however, he proceeds, with his conception as a criterion, 
to the more practical part of his work-the criticism of actual 
forms and types of government and the search for the best and 
most advantageous one possible. 
Since justice consists in a delicate equilibrium of powers, in 
the formation of a perfect harmony out of a number of divers 
elements, it is evident that the task of insuring it is an exceed-
ingly difficult and problematic one, requiring the highest kind of 
ability on the part of the ruler or justiciar. In fact, government is 
an art or a science demanding both natural aptitude and acquired 
skill. As such it is entirely out of the power of the crowd, which 
is bungling and foolish-the government of the many is a con-
tradiction in terms; it is not a government at all but an anarchy. 
I t boasts that it is a government of the people, by the people, for 
the people; and so it may be. But none the less is it a government 
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of the masses, of quantity, not of quality. As such it means the 
suppression of the minority by the majority. And since merit is 
always in the minority, it is the government of the better by the 
worse. Further, as it knows itself to be inferior and to have 
usurped a position which does not belong to it, it rapidly de-
velops a distrust and a hatred for any sort of distinction whatever. 
Under these circumstances there are only two careers open to 
men of ability, who in happier conditions might become philo-
sophers or lovers of wisdom. On the one hand they grow into 
demagogues; for being debarred by their talents from ruling, they 
can only learn to truckle to the multitude and to echo its whims 
and caprices, falsely pretending that these opinions constitute a 
system or philosophy of government-or, as we should say, a 
platform. In Plato's words such persons might be compared to 
.. a man who should study the tempers and desires of a big beast 
... he would learn how to approach and handle it and at what 
times and from what causes it is dangerous or the reverse, and 
what is the meaning of its various cries, and by what sounds it is 
soothed or infuriated; and . . . when by constantly waiting 
upon it, he has become perfect in all this lore, he calls what he 
has learned by the name of wisdom and makes a method or art of 
it . . . calling this honourable and that dishonourable, good and 
evil, just and unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and moods 
of the big beast." Or, on the other hand, the man of ability who 
has no other opening for his activities and who is revolted by 
the role of demagogue, may engage in the single pursuit which the 
mob are capable of respecting; namely, the making of money. 
Hence the growth of a plutocracy along with every democracy. 
At the same time, as the accumulation of great wealth in the 
hands of a few tends to recruit the ranks of the needy, the rise 
of a plutocracy serves to reinforce the democracy which breeds it. 
In this way the proper balance of powers is broken up and 
destroyed; intelligence and courage cease to rule and the passions 
and appetites assume the ascendency; intuition is degraded from 
the reason to the desires. In a word, justice is not the controlling 
principle of such a community, but license, or, as the people 
delight to call it, liberty . 
.. Is not this, indeed, a delightful state of affairs! H exclaims 
Plato with sardonic enthusiasm, "where a man may say and do 
just what he likes" and .. where the individual is able to order his 
own life for himself just as he pleases," "where there is no 
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necessity for you to govern ... or to be governed, unless you 
like" and "where, because some law forbids you to hold office, 
there is no necessity ... that you should not hold office"-
"a charming form of government indeed, full of variety and 
disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals 
alike." And finally, "when a democracy which is thirsting for 
freedom ... has drunk too deeply of the wine of liberty, then, 
unless her rulers are very amenable . . . she calls them to 
account and punishes them "-is Plato prognosticating the 
recall? What she wants are" subjects who are like rulers and 
rulers who are like subjects; these are men after her own heart, 
whom she praises and honours both in private and public," until 
"the anarchy finds by degrees a way into private houses and ends 
by getting among the animals and infecting them." " The 
father grows accustomed to descending to the level of his sons and 
to fearing them, and the son is on a level with his father-for 
neither of his parents has he any respect or reverence. " "The 
teacher fears and wheedles his pupils, and the pupils despise their 
masters and tutors; young and old are all alike--the young man 
is on an equality with the old and is ready to compete with him 
in word and deed; and the old men condescend to the young and 
are full of jocularity and pleasantry, they are loath to be thought 
morose and authoritative and therefore they adopt the manners 
of the youth." "Even the she-dogs are as good as their mis-
tresses; and the horses and the asses have a way of marching 
along with all the rights and dignities of citizens; they will jostle 
a body if he does not get out of their way-and all things are full 
to bursting with liberty." "Above all, see how touchy the 
citizens themselves become; they chafe impatiently at the least 
hint of authority, and at last, as you know, they cease to care 
even for the laws; they will have no one over them. " 
Such is Plato's diagnosis of democracy; and though relieved 
by touches of humour, it is serious enough. Whatever we may 
think of it, it is necessary to remember one thing. Plato is not 
now theorising; he is speaking from experience, he had seen 
democracy distinctly and close at hand. He had never run for 
office, I believe; but he had relatives who had stood within its 
danger and he had followed the trial and condemnation of his 
friend and master, Socrates. But his objections to democracy 
went even deeper. It was not only opposed to his principles by 
its disorderliness or essential injustice, its pretension to distribute 
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a kind of equality among equals and unequals alike, its tacit 
denial of the fundamental facts of nature in the creation of better 
and worse, its confusion of higher and lower; but what was worse, 
it was antipathetic to his own character and disposition, which 
were finely aristocratic and distinguished. To such a person 
democracy has a way, it must be acknowledged, of making itself 
peculiarlY detestable. Where the blame lies, I do not pretend to 
say-on both sides, I fancy. On the one side democracy itself 
has a hatred of distinction, which it makes no effort to conceal. 
As a matter of fact distinction is inimical to its existence. For 
that reason it likes to see pretenders to its favours on all fours at 
its feet. But at the same time it can not be denied that the man 
of distinction frequently displays a superciliousness with respect 
to the masses which is as galling as it is in one sense undeserved. 
Every man is respectable as a human being whatever he may be 
as a constituent of the mob. It is worth noticing that Shake-
speare, who speaks so slightingly of the populace as such, modu-
lates his voice when he addresses its individual members and 
treats even his fools with a kind of human sympathy. But, at all 
events, that Plato detested his democracy as well as disapproved 
of it, seems pretty certain. He detested its vulgarity, its cant, its 
rough and ready judgment, its self-complacency; and he held 
himself aloof from it by prejudice, perhaps, as much as by princi-
ple. Nor were the conditions of demoralisation under which he 
beheld it such as to elicit a favourable criticism even from a more 
unprejudiced observer. Nevertheless, with all allowance made 
for the circumstances, there is still something in what he says to 
make the thoughtful pause before pushing to an extreme a form 
of government which is so particularly liable to extremity and 
whose virtue consists so largely in moderation. Other govern-
ments are likely to fall by deficiency of their own principle, 
democracy alone by its excess. 
At the opposite pole from the democratic type of government 
is the monarchical. With Plato's sympathies and ideas it is not 
surprising that he should more incline to the latter than the for-
mer terminal, although he can not approve of it unreservedly. 
Nevertheless, in the actual state of things, of all systems that 
seem to be possible he appears to believe that the best chance of 
securing something like justice is by the instrumentality of a 
benevolent despot-a single arbitrary ruler of good parts and 
disposition, neither weak rior violent, uniting in his own person 
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the three attributes of the perfect governor-wisdom, courage, 
and steadiness. Such a character would appear to be best 
equipped for weaving a harmonious design from the diverse ele-
ments of society; above all he would seem to have the best 
opportunity of carrying out a consistent policy. In this charac-
terisation may possibly be detected a regret for Dionysus of 
Syracuse, of whom he had hoped so much and in whom he had 
been so bitterly disappointed. At all events, as he acknowledges, 
the happy conjunction of circumstances necessary to unite these 
qualities in a single individual and to bring this individual into 
power is so rare as to be wellnigh miraculous. And in default 
of such a ruler he declares for a kind of limited or constitutional 
monarchy, whose master is restrained and controlled by law. As 
for the other forms of government by the few as opposed to the 
many-namely, oligarchy and tyranny-he has for them no 
toleration of any kind whatever. 
In following Plato's discussion, as I have tried to do, with an 
eye to what seems most pertinent to our particular occasions, I 
have implicitly taken account of the most important tenets of 
his political creed as far as they have any modern interest or 
significance. It remains to indicate what is positive rather than 
negative in his conception. In the first place, that his theory of 
government is aristocratic, is perfectly clear. The two systems 
that he reprobates the most severely are democracy and pluto-
cracy. The symbolic or metaphoric republic that he constructs 
for the purpose of illustrating the city of the soul, is ruled over 
by an aristocracy and an aristocracy pretty much unhampered 
by laws except of its own making. The will of the aristocracy is 
the law. And not only is it a government by an aristocracy which 
is the ideal but a government for the aristocracy. The purpose 
and raison d'2tre of a state is to be sought not in mediocrity but in 
excellence. It is not by its average that a nation is justified but 
by its genius. And to the production and preservation of genius 
should its efforts be directed. Not that the remainder of society 
is non-essential and negligible, but it takes its value from above; 
and the cultivation of an industrial community merely for its 
own sake would have struck him as absurdly as the attempt to 
develop a stomach independent of the body. 
As far as these conclusions are a matter of terms, an affair of 
logic pure and simple, it is difficult to see that Plato is very far 
wrong in them. That the best are alone the natural rulers of a 
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state and that the ruling should be done in the interests of the 
best is so obvious on statement that it has taken any amount of 
sophistication and any number of centuries to make it appear 
otherwise. Even then the contrary opinion has succeeded in 
gaining a footing only by means of an indoctrinated convention 
as gross as Plato's parable of the gold, the silver, and the bronze 
men-a convention so at odds with the facts that its falsity is 
patent to the most superficial. That convention consists in the 
denial of the aristocratic principle-in the denial, that is, of any 
such natural distinction as better and worse. Or positively, it 
consists in the assertion of the romantic doctrine of equality-a 
doctrine that we are obliged to deny in deed a dozen or more 
times a day. In fact, so contrary is it to our actual convictions 
that even the candidate for office is revolted when he is compelled 
to act consistently in accord with it and to abase himself to the 
level of those whom for the occasion he delicately designates as 
his equals. N or is such a distinction between better and worse a 
practical impossibility. For the rough and ready purposes of 
government it is easy enough to make a partition of the kind. 
Education, property, nativity, even sex constitute tests sufficient 
for practical politics. And yet, as usual in human affairs, there is 
in reality one obstacle in the way of applying the theory. The 
world is full of people who have come into it more or less acci-
dentally and unintentionally. As they are here by no fault of their 
own and in fact would gladly be almost anywhere else if they 
could, and as in the gaiety of their hearts they will in all proba-
bility proceed to bring others like them into a place to which they 
find themselves so admirably adapted; the theoretical legislator 
. like Plato finds himself at any given time with a collection of 
odds and ends on his hands, which it is extremely difficult to dis-
pose of. To be sure, there may be no great harm in this folk. 
To adapt Plato's own figure, they are like the amiable but in-
capable owner of a vessel, who is a little hard of hearing and 
short of sight, and is indifferently acquainted with navigation, 
and who is coaxed and bullied by various members of the crew 
who hope to get the job of pilot. At the same time it is just 
this sort of gentry that complicates the legislator's problem. 
Ideally Plato begins by making a clean sweep of them. He 
dumps the rubbish somewhere outside of his boundaries and 
retains only such material as suits his own designs. But the 
solution seems hardly practicable at present. And under the 
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circumstances it is this matter which destroys the regularity and 
symmetry of many a very pretty social theory. It is itself one 
of the forces or factors which go to shape the final result as it ex-
ists in fact and nature. It is a part of the destiny of nations. In 
short, if you have a population of a certain type, what else can 
you make of it than the kind of thing it lends itself to? At the 
same time, to rescue as much of Plato's aristocracy as is feasible, 
it is worth while trying to make the best of your materials. 
In the second place, innovator as Plato seems at first sight, it 
is clear, on second thoughts, that he is all for conservatism, as for 
aristocracy. Perhaps the two ideas are in reality correlatives. 
At all events, once his ideal republic established, he would pre-
serve it, if possible, in much the same shape forever. Indeed, 
rigidity is of its very essence. As its partitions are inflexible and 
inelastic, allowing only for a few sorts of vocation; so in itself 
it forms a more or less motionless and inalterable structure, in-
capable of any great modification or adaptation. For the culti-
vation of that wide variety of individual character which we 
esteem one of the merits of civilisation, it had no care. In its 
essence it was thoroughly socialistic--a kind of higher organism 
in which the citizen had pretty well lost his personality. Like 
modem socialism it guaranteed his existence at the cost of his 
liberty. Further, as the best state conceivable, there naturally 
remained nothing more to do for it except to conserve it in accord-
ance with the principles laid down for its institution. On the 
whole, this seems to me one of the instances in which Plato is 
carried away by his project; and, as so often happens in such 
cases, it is necessary to go a little deeper to get the steady bearing 
of his thought. Obviously enough the motive that moves him 
in this particular instance is a care for the permanency of political 
institutions. And in this respect he agrees with Burke. He 
recognises as true what is too patent to be insisted upon-that 
the life of a nation is a slow development, that its present rests 
upon its past, and that any change should be made slowly and 
carefully in the direction of its growth. He sees that a state 
which breaks with its tradition is adrift and that innovation is 
especially dangerous in a matter of government, whose adjust-
ments are so delicate and complicated as frequently to escape the 
scrutiny of a single lawgiver or even of an entire generation. 
"All other errors but disturb a state, 
But innovation is the blow of fate." 
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Not that he denies the value of a legislator who is thoroughly 
advised; such a person with the adaptability to meet any emerg-
ency with intelligence, is better than any set of mechanical laws 
or provisions that can be devised in advance. But with the 
difficulty of obtaining such a director at any given time before 
his eyes-a difficulty that amounts to a virtual impossibility-
he recommends a prudential respect for antiquity and tradition. 
In the third place and finally, Plato's ideas are as moral as 
they are aristocratic and conservative. The model of the just 
city is the just man. And as the just man exists for virtue, as he 
finds his happiness and good in virtue alone, so the just com-
munity exists for the same end and prospers accordingly. That 
Plato overworks the similitude between the two cases, must be 
granted. The main purpose, the higher justification of the 
Republic resides in demonstrating that the happiness of the just 
is the sole real and permanent good. The institution of the state 
is in one sense a side issue, undertaken for that purpose. Hence 
Plato is continually forcing the analogy. But in any case his 
constant insistence upon the necessity of virtue as a part of the 
very being of government, may at least lead us to ask whether 
the modern divorce between morality and public policy is al-
together justified, whether it is not in some sense parallel with 
the attempt to separate morality from literature and art. That 
our civil government might be a little healthier for an infiltration 
of morality, I suppose, no one will dispute. And that inter-
national affairs should be conducted with some eye to moral 
considerations, would not be entirely out of the way either. And 
yet this is not just the point. By considering government from 
this point of view, Plato, like Burke at a much later day, was 
saved from making of politics a mere technology removed from 
other concerns and artificially isolated as a wholly independent 
and self-sufficient study like physics or dynamics. On the con-
trary, he was able by this means to keep it in constant touch 
with human nature. In consequence he succeeded in reducing 
some of the eternal principles of the subject to their very root in 
the moral consciousness. And as a result, while many of his 
shifts and expedients seem little better than ridiculous, his 
general discussion has always commanded the attention and 
respect of statesmen of all nationalities and all ages. 
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